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Exchanging information
Information exchanges between competitors: the Italian Competition
Authority's recent practice
By Antonio Capobianco and Stefano Fratta, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP*
In 2004, two cases on exchanges of information between
competitors were decided by the Italian competition authority
(“AGCM” – the Autorità Garante per la Concorrenza ed il
Mercato). This revived a lively debate on the conditions in
which these practices should be prohibited and whether they
are anticompetitive per se.
Over the years, the AGCM has taken a firm stand against
such practices, in some cases beyond that taken by the Euro-
pean Commission and the European Court. This article
reviews the rules and outlines the innovative approach that the
AGCM has recently adopted.
AGCM’s case law on information exchanges
In the early years of its enforcement practice, the AGCM
largely followed EU rulings, relying mainly on two factors:
(i) the type and quality of the information exchanged, and
(ii) the structure of the market on which the participants to
the exchange are active
More specifically, the AGCM has usually taken the following
elements into account:
• The subject matter of the exchange: Confidential information
on the essence of the business, such as prices, quantities
and commercial strategies, cannot generally be disclosed to
competitors. The AGCM carries out a case-by-case assess-
ment of exchanges of information on other matters, such
as product deliveries, deliveries to customers, capacity
utilisation, output and sales figures, and market shares.
• The level of detail: This influences competitors’ ability to
coordinate their market strategies. The greater the detail,
the greater the possibility of predicting another’s future
conduct and of adjusting conduct accordingly. In general,
the AGCM does not object to the dissemination of aggre-
gated data that does not allow individual companies’
information to be identified, although it has not indicated
a minimum level of aggregation needed to prevent an
antitrust investigation. Case by case, the degree of aggre-
gation should be sufficient to prevent identification.
• Frequency of exchange: Companies can adapt their com-
mercial policy to their competitors’ strategies better and in
a more timely fashion if data exchanges are more frequent.
• The nature of the products in question: It is easier for com-
panies to coordinate prices in homogeneous product mar-
kets. In differentiated product markets, access to detailed
sensitive information about competitors may not be as
useful in predicting their future behaviour.
• The level of concentration in the market: According to the
traditional approach of the Commission and the European
Court, the more concentrated a market, the easier it is for
competitors to find and enforce sustainable coordination.
The AGCM is extremely careful in reviewing exchanges of
information in oligopolistic markets, particularly if these
are protected by high entry barriers.
While this approach is in line with the Commission’s practice
and the case law of the European Courts, in some recent cases
the AGCM has departed from it and has adopted a different
and innovative view.
“Philip Morris/Cigarette Retailers”
The facts
In February 2003, Philip Morris (PM) notified the AGCM of
a standard agreement that PM intended to enter with a signifi-
cant number of tobacco retailers. According to the agreement,
retailers had to transmit to PM, on an exclusive basis,
information on the sales volumes of their outlets, and notably
information on
(i) PM’s daily sales volumes by brand,
(ii) the retailer’s daily aggregated sale volumes, and
(iii) the daily sales of each cigarette brand sold by the retailer.
PM was to receive such information monthly.
The AGCM decided to open an investigation on the
ground that PM would gain a competitive advantage vis-à-vis
its competitors by foreclosing access to the same or a com-
parable set of detailed and sensitive information on the sale of
cigarettes in Italy. It considered that PM’s initiative, which
would give it detailed exclusive information on its competi-
tors’ sales on a daily basis, might go beyond what was necessary
for PM to monitor its own business trends. Indeed, the
investigation showed that the retailers selected by PM repre-
sented the best statistical group for such an exercise because of
their number, size, location and type of business. The exclu-
sivity clause clearly prevented competitors from replicating a
similarly representative set of retailers.
In the course of the investigation, PM removed the exclu-
sivity, thus eliminating the main vertical concern raised by the
AGCM. At the same time, PM argued that the agreement had
procompetitive effects, in particular that it would generate
distribution efficiencies, such as avoidance of the stock dis-
ruption that is the main factor driving demand towards
competing brands.
The decision
In June 2004, the AGCM concluded that PM’s standard agree-
ment did not infringe the Competition Act (Bolletino 24 of 2004).
The AGCM was confronted by an unusual situation. There was
no direct exchange of information between competitors (i.e. no
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direct horizontal effects) as the exchange took place between
companies at different levels of trade. Nevertheless, the agree-
ment could indirectly affect horizontal competition between
cigarette suppliers since it concerned sensitive information
relating to the market for the sale of cigarettes.
The AGCM’s analysis of the relevant market is not very
detailed. It concluded that:
• The Italian market for the sale of cigarettes is extremely
concentrated – HHI 4,569 in 2000 and 4,480 in 2003
(AGCM’s findings in BAT/ETI, Bollettino 51 of 2003).
• The market had been affected by anticompetitive practices
for many years. In particular, the AGCM had previously
found that PM and ETI (the former national monopoly,
now privatised and acquired by BAT – British American
Tobacco) had colluded to prevent competitors from
growing in the Italian market (AGCM’s findings in tobacco
prices investigation, Bollettino 11 of 2003).
• For about a decade, PM had been the leading operator
and, together with ETI, had held a collective dominant
position with a combined market share in the range 90%
(AGCM’s findings in BAT/ETI).
• The market is characterised by a significant degree of trans-
parency concerning prices, which are regularly published
in the Official Journal. Transparency as to volume is less,
since Etinera (ETI’s subsidiary which distributes cigarettes
nationwide on a de facto monopoly basis) only disseminates
aggregated statistics to the market participants.
• After ETI’s privatisation and sale to BAT, the conditions of
competition improved considerably. PM has experienced a
significant reduction in its market share, mainly to the
benefit of BAT.
The withdrawal of the exclusivity clause had already
eliminated most of the AGCM’s concerns on foreclosure of
the market for the acquisition of information from the tobacco
retailers. The decision therefore focused on the effects of
enforcement of PM’s standard agreement on the market for
the sale of cigarettes.
The AGCM took a positive view of the notified agreement.
In particular, it noted that acquisition of information in such a
detailed and systematic fashion could allow more efficient
monitoring of demand trends on both a geographic and a
point-of-sale basis. It concluded that the agreement could con-
tribute to better product distribution and brand positioning.
In support of its non-infringement decision, the AGCM
noted that market conditions had significantly changed during
the investigation:
• the second and third largest suppliers after PM (BAT and
ETI) had merged, creating the second largest operator. As
a result, PM’s market share had decreased by about 10%,
while BAT’s market share had risen.
• Through its merger with ETI, BAT had acquired access to
sensitive and extremely detailed information on its com-
petitors’ sales through its distribution subsidiary, Etinera.
• The AGCM decided to clear BAT’s acquisition of ETI sub-
ject to conditions during the course of its investigation of the
PM standard agreement, which it had suspended. In particu-
lar, it concluded that the conditions imposed on BAT would
eliminate the situation that had allowed the collective domi-
nant position held by PM and ETI to be sustained.
In the light of all these factors, the AGCM concluded that the
standard agreement would allow PM to respond more appro-
priately to the competitive threat represented by BAT’s ability
to operate on the basis of detailed market knowledge acquired
through Etinera. In other words, the AGCM maintained that
the agreement would allow the creation (or the re-creation,
after BAT’s acquisition of Etinera) of a “level playing field”
between PM and BAT as far the detailed knowledge of the
Italian market for the sale of cigarettes was concerned.
Comment
The situation was unusual – a vertical agreement capable of
having direct horizontal effects. Nevertheless, the decision is
based on an unsupported assumption that PM would use the
information acquired through the agreement to compete
rather than to collude, despite the fact that the market is highly
concentrated and involves a homogenous product.
An interesting feature of this decision is the analysis – or
rather the lack of analysis – of the relationship between PM’s
market power and the artificial market transparency created by
its system. In the contemporaneous investigation of the
BAT/ETI merger, the AGCM concluded that PM was no
longer collectively dominant with ETI. However, no dis-
cussion whatsoever can be found on whether PM might now
hold a single dominant position.
This is an important factor in view of the European Court’s
ruling in the AKZO judgment ([1991] ECR I-3359) that it is
abusive to require customers to supply sensitive details about
competitors with the purpose of gaining a competitive advan-
tage over them. According to the Court, such a practice is not
a normal means of competition and may result in violation of
the competition rules.
Another issue raised by the decision is whether the outcome
of the case would have been the same had a similar set of
information been exchanged directly between the cigarette
manufacturers (viz between PM and BAT, which together
control nearly all the Italian market) rather than through a
vertical agreement with the retailers.
The reasoning followed by the AGCM to demonstrate that
the standard agreement would generate procompetitive effects
seems to plead in favour of a positive answer to this question.
On the other hand, an extensive interpretation of this decision
would lead to the conclusion that any, or most, information
exchanges between competitors could be justified by the
increased transparency that allows the parties to respond more
appropriately to the competitive threat and to operate on the
basis of a better and more detailed knowledge of the market.
Finally, there is no discussion in the AGCM’s decision on
whether the increased transparency created by the agreement
to the sole advantage of PM may facilitate exclusionary anti-
competitive practices in this market.
In particular, the decision makes it clear that only PM
(through the notified system) and BAT (through its
distribution subsidiary, Etinera) will have access to detailed
information on competitors’ sales, while their competitors –
with only 10-20% of the market – will have access to the
limited set of aggregated information disseminated by Etinera
according to their distribution agreement. It was not discussed
whether PM and BAT will have information that might allow
them to anticipate, and so defeat, competitive moves from
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fringe competitors, thereby chilling competition in the
market.
A comparative reading of this decision and the decision in
the BAT/ETI merger case clearly shows that the AGCM used
these proceedings to “remedy” the failure to impose the
divestiture of Etinera on BAT as a condition for clearing the
acquisition of ETI, a remedy that PM formally asked for in the
proceedings (BAT/ETI, Bollettino 51 of 2003, para 34).
Imposition of such a condition on BAT could have jeopar-
dised the successful privatisation of ETI, depriving BAT of
one of ETI’s crown jewels. It can be concluded that the
AGCM’s rationale was dictated by industrial policy goals, i.e.
to level the playing field between the two giants of the tobacco
industry, allowing them to compete on the basis of the same
detailed market information.
“Iama Consulting”
The facts
Following separate notifications by two Italian insurance
companies of their agreements with Iama Consulting for the
acquisition of Aequos, a database containing detailed inform-
ation on life assurance and pension insurance products, the
AGCM opened an investigation. This was quickly extended to
all insurance companies that had acquired the database.
The Aequos database offered the buyer access to sensitive
information on all insurance and pension products available on
the Italian market. That information was disaggregated (i.e.
available for each product separately) and was released to the
buyer on a quarterly basis. According to the initial notifi-
cations, the information contained in Aequos was publicly
available and was taken from documents provided by
insurance companies to customers.
In October 2003, the AGCM decided to open an investi-
gation on the ground that the information contained in Aequos
and the products offered by Iama Consulting were current,
detailed and sensitive information on individual competing
products, the dissemination of which could alter the conditions
of competition in the market and could facilitate forms of
horizontal coordination between insurance companies.
The decision opening the investigation (Bollettino 41 of
2003) makes a straightforward statement on the potential anti-
competitive effects of an exchange of publicly available infor-
mation when the individual costs for each market participant
to collect such information are high. According to the
AGCM, reduction of the cost of collecting the information in
such situations will not generate efficiency gains to the benefit
of consumers but will increase incentives to collude on the
basis of the common information.
The decision
In September 2004, after an in-depth investigation, the AGCM
prohibited the acquisition of Aequos by the insurance com-
panies as it was a concerted practice for the horizontal exchange
of sensitive information between insurance companies, contrary
to the Italian Competition Act (Bolletino 40 of 2004).
The structure of the relevant market was moderately con-
centrated (CR4 56%, HHI 1000) but characterised at the same
time by a certain instability in market shares. This could indi-
cate the existence of competition. The nine insurance com-
panies that had acquired the Aequos database held a combined
market share of 75% in the market for life insurance products.
Contrary to what the parties had asserted in their notifications,
the investigation revealed that:
• The information contained in the Aequos database was
supplied to Iama Consulting by the insurance companies
themselves, and was not independently collected from the
market by Iama Consulting. This firm simply processed
the information received, adding little to it before selling it
to the insurance companies. The AGCM concluded that
the exchange of information could qualify as a restriction
of competition in the form of a concerted practice
between competitors.
• The information contained in Aequos had an added value
in comparison with the information that individual
insurance companies could collect directly from the
market and from public sources. While some had a public
nature (prices and conditions of the policies), the data were
not in the public domain in as far as they were not
immediately and easily accessible to the insurance com-
panies at little or no cost.
• Consumers could not buy the Aequos database. It was a
product reserved to insurance companies. This circum-
stance restricted the advantages of the increased trans-
parency to suppliers alone. The AGCM found this to be
evidence of the anticompetitive purpose of the exchange.
The AGCM concluded that the parallel acquisition of the
Aequos database by a large number of insurance companies
amounted to an anticompetitive exchange of information on
the ground that it was likely to encourage collusion between
the parties.
Comment
Three aspects of the decision are of a particular interest:
1. The irrelevance of the public nature of the information exchanged
when the cost of collecting such information is high: The European
Courts have held that the exchange of publicly available
information should not be considered an infringement of EC
competition rules. In its recent judgment on the TACA case
(Atlantic Container Line v Commission), the CFI was asked to
review the Commission’s conclusion that an exchange of
public information was an infringement of article 81 EC. The
Court noted that, if the information is in the public domain as
a result of a compulsory publication or if it can be easily de-
duced from publicly available information, its disclosure
between competitors cannot be considered an infringement.
In the Iama Consulting decision, the AGCM considered that
the fact that the information was obtained by Iama Consulting
directly from the different insurance companies indicated that
the information itself was not in the public domain. If the
information was readily available, there would be no reason to
set up a costly exchange system.
It is also interesting to note that, in the decision to open the
investigation, the AGCM introduced the idea that the
collection of publicly available information by an independent
third party for sale to competing companies could in itself
amount to an infringement of competition rules. Although
the investigation disclosed that the information set used to
build the Aequos database was not all publicly available, the
obiter dictum remains and puts the AGCM at the forefront of
enforcement in this area.
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2. Transparency on the supply side versus transparency on the demand
side: The AGCM found that the exchange of information was
beneficial only to the insurance companies (supply side) and
had no efficiency effect on the demand side since consumers
and/or their associations had no access to the Aequos database.
The AGCM suggested that, if the market transparency
achieved extends also to the benefit of consumers, this may
generate positive effects on competition capable of counter-
balancing any collusive effects created by the increased trans-
parency on the supply side, basing this on a twofold argument:
• The fact that consumers benefit from greater market trans-
parency renders the demand more elastic, which generally
leads to a lower price equilibrium.
• The increased elasticity of demand perceived by competitors
may, in a dynamic context, undermine any potential collu-
sive practice. In particular, transparency on the demand side
facilitates the comparison between the different offers and
thus increases the number of consumers who will acquire the
more suitable product. At the same time, the increased
elasticity creates an incentive for companies to abandon the
collusive behaviour and autonomously lower their prices.
This incentive effect is considerable, and generally overrides
the negative effect that may be generated by greater elasticity
of demand – a more elastic demand makes it easier to punish
deviating companies through a lowering of prices.
The AGCM’s reasoning seems to be generally applicable to
any exchange of information that increases transparency on
the demand side. Even if it is formulated in cautious language,
the AGCM has probably generalised a defence for companies
involved in information exchanges. If the information
collected is made available to the general public, there is now
a presumption that such an exchange is not anticompetitive.
This expands on what the European Courts have already said
– the communication of the exchanged information between
the suppliers to the buyers may counterbalance the anti-
competitive effects of the exchange and thus render the
practice compatible with competition rules.
3. The exchange of information may have anticompetitive effects in
non-concentrated markets also: In this respect, the AGCM
referred to its previous RC Auto decision where it decided that
the exchange of information between competing insurance
companies in a non-concentrated market could be a restriction
of competition. In its decision (Bollettino 30 of 2000), the
AGCM argued that even in non-oligopolistic markets an
exchange of information may be restrictive of competition if
it concerns prices and if consumers do not benefit from the
greater transparency.
The Iama Consulting decision confirms that, according to the
AGCM, the fact that an exchange of information takes place
in a relatively non-concentrated market cannot be used to
argue that the exchange of information has no anticompetitive
effects. In addition, the AGCM explicitly confirmed that
exchanges of information are more necessary to ensure the
stability of a collusive agreement in a non-concentrated
market, where the costs of collecting information and
monitoring the strategies of competitors are higher than in
concentrated oligopolistic markets.
This position has no precedent in Commission or European
Court practice. On the contrary, this has established a
presumption of legality when the exchange of information
concerns products in competitive markets (e.g. Commission’s
decision in UK Agricultural Tractor Exchange, OJ 1992 L68/19,
para 37, and CFI judgment in J Deere v Commission [1994]
ECR II-957, para 49).
The AGCM’s practice therefore shifts the burden of proof
for the companies involved. According to EU case law, the
investigating authority has the burden of demonstrating that,
notwithstanding the existence of a non-concentrated market,
the exchange may nevertheless have a restrictive effect on
competition. By contrast, according to the AGCM’s Iama
Consulting decision, the existence of a coordinated exchange of
information on a non-concentrated market is an additional
presumption that goes towards proof of the anticompetitive-
ness of the practice in question.
Conclusions
The two decisions are symptomatic of an innovative approach
adopted by the AGCM on the exchange of information
between competitors. The new element that distinguishes the
AGCM’s recent analysis from existing case law on the subject
is the assessment of the reaction of demand to a potential
collusive equilibrium on the supply side. However, the
AGCM’s position remains consistent with the general under-
standing that exchanges of information should be prohibited
as such only when they are likely to contribute to a tacitly
collusive agreement. If demand is sufficiently elastic to react to
a concerted price increase, it will undermine the stability of
any tacit coordination.
Economic analysis can also explain the apparently divergent
approaches that the AGCM has taken in the two decisions
described in this article. In the PM decision, it considered that
the agreement had procompetitive effects even if it affected a
highly concentrated market. On the other hand, in the Iama
Consulting decision, it considered that the increased trans-
parency of the market created by the concerted practice could
have anticompetitive effects even if the market was char-
acterised by low concentration and relative competition.
If the two decisions are reviewed in the light of the potential
reaction of consumers, however, it is apparent how the analysis
of the demand was indeed the driving factor in both cases. In
the PM case, the existence of complete price transparency
allowed customers to compare brands easily and to switch
producers in case of price rises. Accordingly, the AGCM could
clear the agreement even if it gave rise to significant artificial
transparency in a highly concentrated market.
By contrast, in the Iama Consulting decision, the demand was
not elastic and customers were unable to undermine the
stability of a potential collusive equilibrium transparency.
Transparency, therefore, was considered to be an additional
tool for the creation of collusion in the market. As a result, the
AGCM prohibited the exchange.
This may prove be a hot topic for discussion also among the
European Commission and other competition authorities in
the EU, since it anchors economic analysis in the still rather
formalistic approach to competition assessment taken by the
Commission and Court. The AGCM has thus contributed to
one of the main aims of the modernisation of competition
enforcement in Europe.
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